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MANAGING FOR PERFORMANCE: MEASUREMENT AND MONITORING 
OF CONTRACTS IN THE TRANSIT INDUSTRY 
Olga Smirnova, Juita-Elena (Wie) Yusuf and Suzanne Leland* 
  
ABSTRACT. Public agencies contract out to pursue a variety of goals.  But, 
these goals cannot be realized if the performance of contractors is not 
assessed and monitored.  This study examines the state of performance 
measurement and contract monitoring in the U.S. transit agencies.  We 
focus on three research questions: (1) What monitoring capacity exists 
within transit agencies? (2) What monitoring methods are used by transit 
agencies? (3) What performance measures are tracked by transit agencies? 
We find monitoring units are common in a third of agencies in the study. 
Service and customer complaints are the most common performance 
measures, while penalties and liquidated damages are the most frequent 
form of penalties. Finally, we find that transit agencies utilize a variety of 
output and outcome measures to monitor contractors.   
INTRODUCTION 
The last three decades have seen growing emphasis on 
performance measurement and management as a mechanism for 
ensuring accountability (Boyne, Gould-Williams, Law, & Walker, 2002; 
Dubnick, 2005). More recently, interest in performance measurement 
has been driven by a number of forces, such as increased citizen 
distrust of government, taxpayer revolts, devolution of responsibility 
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to lower levels of government, legislative actions to manage spending, 
and privatization (Poister, 2008).  Yet, while privatization has 
contributed to the call for greater accountability, it has complicated 
efforts to use performance measurement as a tool. 
The growth of contracting out services has led many agencies to 
examine how they monitor their contracts in order to maximize their 
effectiveness.  Scholars have emphasized that when public services 
are outsourced, their provision (and performance) needs to be 
monitored.  Regular tracking and monitoring is a key characteristic of 
performance measurement. Public agencies contract out to pursue a 
variety of objectives, including achieving cost savings, realizing greater 
efficiency, managing risks, and improving service delivery.  However, 
such contracting may pose risks to government; in several American 
examples, contracting has been marked by graft, corruption, and 
concerns about service quality (Durant, Girth, & Johnston, 2009; 
Keeney, 2007).  Furthermore, the benefits of contracts cannot be 
realized if the performance of contractors is not assessed and 
monitored.  Contracting out for services presents challenges to 
performance measurement, due largely to information asymmetry and 
the possibility of opportunistic behavior by private contractors 
(Amirkhanyan, 2011).  Government agencies must be smart buyers 
and smart managers of contracts (Fossett et al., 2000; Kettl, 1993), 
but research on the “hollow state” (Howlett, 2000; Milward & Provan, 
2000; Milward, Provan, & Else, 1993) has raised concerns about 
government’s ability to manage provision of contracted services. 
Milward (1994) noted the irony of contracting in that it is promoted 
as the solution to government inefficiency and mismanagement, but 
can work well only if the government agency manages the process 
effectively.  Other researchers have similarly acknowledged the 
importance of contract management, and contract monitoring 
specifically.  Gormley (1994) pointed to the need to monitor to “avoid 
unfettered discretion” (p. 231) and to evaluate performance to ensure 
that contracts provide the desired outputs and outcomes.  Fossett et 
al. (2000) suggested that, to be prudent purchasers, government 
agencies must be able to specify performance measures, determine if 
and how contractors are meeting performance metrics, and hold 
contractors accountable for meeting the metrics by sanctioning them 
for failure to perform.  As  Potoski noted, “The pressing question is no 
longer whether  government should purchase goods and services but 
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rather when to purchase and how to manage and regulate purchasing” 
(2008, p. S58).  
This study analyzes the current state of practice of contract 
monitoring and performance measurement in the transit industry.  We 
utilize data from a survey of transit agencies in the U.S. to examine 
contract monitoring practices, including monitoring capacity, 
monitoring methods, and performance measures.  To supplement the 
survey findings and add more depth to our analysis, we also develop 
profiles of contract monitoring and performance measurement 
practices in ‘typical’ agencies.   
CONTRACTING OF TRANSIT SERVICES 
We believe that the transit industry provides valuable insight into 
performance management of contracts because of the industry’s 
contracting history.  Public transportation was originally provided by 
private companies and over time transitioned to a government-
dominated industry. Eventually, government entities began contracting 
with private companies for the delivery of transit services.  
State and local governments in the U.S. rely extensively on 
contracting for public transit services (rather than in-house provision).  
Data from the National Transit Database show that this trend began in 
the 1980s, and today, over half of transit agencies contract out.  
However, empirical evidence over the last several decades suggests 
that cost-savings do not necessarily materialize automatically from 
contracting out transit services (Leland & Smirnova, 2009; Perry & 
Babitsky, 1986; Smirnova & Leland, 2014; Zullo, 2008).  Smirnova and 
Leland concluded that public agencies “should pay attention to 
monitoring the performance of the contract and should also keep in 
mind the challenges of liability, diminished capacity, and some loss of 
control over daily operations that might occur during contracting out” 
(2014, p. 362).   
Nowhere is the reliance on contracting for complex tasks or 
services more evident than in the delivery of transit services.  In this 
study, we examine contract monitoring and performance 
measurement practices of transit agencies in the U.S.  Specifically, we 
focus on three questions: 
(1) What monitoring capacity exists within transit agencies? 
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(2) What monitoring methods are used by transit agencies? 
(3) What performance measures are tracked by transit agencies? 
Answering these questions will provide insight into if and how transit 
agencies are investing in contract measurement and monitoring 
activities.   
Challenges of Contracting 
Contracts for public service are often underspecified or 
incomplete, which may allow opportunistic vendors to exploit contracts 
(Brown & Potoski, 2006).  Two key challenges faced by government 
agencies are: (1) ensuring achievement of contracting goals (e.g. cost 
savings, improved service delivery); and (2) ensuring accountability.    
Yusuf and O’Connell (2014) suggested the possibility of an 
accountability dilemma associated with outsourcing complex 
government services; this accountability dilemma drives the need for 
greater contract management and oversight.  The use of contracting 
exacerbates the general challenges of accountability and performance 
management.  “Even though the actual delivery of public works and 
infrastructure may be performed by private sector partners, public 
agencies are not exempt from being accountable to their multiple 
stakeholders for performance” (Yusuf & Leavitt, 2014, p. 213).  
The classical lens used to study and practice contracting is rooted 
in principal-agent theory, transaction cost economics, the theory of 
market competition, and standard procurement practices (Apte, Apte, 
& Rendon, 2011; Fernandez, 2007).  Contracts are defined as 
“discrete arm’s-length transactions between adversaries with 
competing interests” (Fernandez, 2007, p. 1125).  Overcoming the 
challenges of performance and accountability requires properly 
structuring the contractual relationship, reducing information 
asymmetry, and limiting contractors’ opportunistic behavior.  Public 
agencies can do so through several means, such as increasing 
competition, specifying contracts precisely and in detail, and rigorously 
monitoring contractors’ performance (Brown & Potoski, 2003b, 2003c; 
Hefetz & Warner, 2004; Kettl, 1993; Rehfuss, 1990; Romzek & 
Johnston, 2002; Savas, 2000, 2002; Seidenstat, 1999).  In this paper, 
we focus on contract monitoring and performance measurement 
practices of transit agencies as mechanisms for holding contractors 
accountable. 
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Contract Monitoring and Performance Measurement 
Effective monitoring of contracts allows government to better 
benefit from contracting (Brown & Potoski, 2003b, 2006).  During the 
evaluation phase of contracting, public agencies require evaluation 
capacity to monitor and evaluate the contractor’s performance to 
determine if its contract responsibilities are met. “[B]uilding contract 
management capacity includes acquiring and nurturing physical 
infrastructure, financial resources, and perhaps most important, 
human capital” (Brown & Potoski, 2006, p. 325).   
As Gormley noted, “Accountability continues to be the Achilles heel 
of many contracts” (1994, p. 224).  Performance measurement is a 
critical element of effective contract accountability, which Romzek and 
Johnston defined as when “the state is able to design, implement, 
manage, and achieve accountability for its … contract” (2005, p. 237).  
For effective contract accountability, monitoring mechanisms must be 
in place to provide data for contract evaluation.  Strong monitoring 
capability contributes to achievement of outputs and outcomes by 
allowing the government agency to ensure effective oversight and 
assure contract compliance with standards of service provision.  
Identifying performance measures and monitoring them allows for 
objective assessment of outcomes.   
Amirkhanyan (2011) found performance measurement to have a 
positive impact on government’s ability to effectively manage 
contracts.  Specifically, performance measures that included costs, 
client impact, service timeliness, service disruptions, and process-
related service delivery measures were associated with accountability 
effectiveness.  “Rigorous contract monitoring is supposed to improve 
success in contracting by identifying instances of inappropriate or 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the contractor and by detecting 
performance fluctuations and shortfalls” (Fernandez, 2007, p. 1126).   
Fossett et al. (2000) pointed to three key components of prudent 
purchasing: (1) specifying performance measures; (2) determining if 
and how contractors are meeting performance metrics; and (3) holding 
contractors accountable by rewarding performance and sanctioning 
failure to perform.  Our examination of the state of practice of 
performance measurement and contract monitoring by transit 
agencies will focus on these three components.  
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Fernandez (2007) focused on two components of contract 
monitoring:  monitoring scope or the variety of aspects of performance 
that are monitored, and monitoring intensity which is the use of 
different monitoring tools and procedures to assess contractor 
performance.  Yang, Hsieh, and Li (2009) defined evaluation capacity 
as: (1) having a formal monitoring system to evaluate whether 
contractors have fulfilled the responsibilities specified in the contract; 
(2) utilizing monitoring techniques such as filed inspections, periodic 
evaluations, and recipient interviews; (3) requiring regular, formal 
performance reporting; and (4) monitoring the contracted service 
continuously to ensure performance.  
Transit agencies seem to acknowledge the need for contract 
monitoring and performance measurement.  In a 2001 survey of 237 
transit agencies that contract transit services, General Managers of the 
transit agencies were asked to offer advice to other agencies 
considering contracting (Transportation Research Board, 2001). The 
top three recommendations were all related to contract administration 
and monitoring.  First, the managers pointed to the need for specificity 
in defining the duties and responsibilities of contractors. Second, they 
suggested that well-defined performance standards be included in the 
contract, and contractors be rewarded for exceeding standards and 
penalized for poor performance. Third, monitoring contract 
performance was identified as important. Furthermore, the managers 
highlighted “the importance of clearly communicating the agency’s 
intention to monitor the work and to hold the contractor responsible for 
meeting agreed-upon standards” (p. 126).  Subsequent follow-up 
interviews underscored the importance of performance monitoring.  
Specifying Performance Measures 
Poister pointed out that developing performance measurement 
systems is relatively straightforward for “production-oriented agencies 
with more tangible service delivery systems such as those related to 
public works and infrastructure” (2008, p. 18).  But, when the public 
service landscape is characterized by multiple organizations from 
multiple sectors (e.g., government and private) involved in financing, 
delivering, and/or managing public infrastructure, it is more difficult to 
specify what service providers are to accomplish (Behn & Kant, 1999; 
Poister, 2008).  Public agencies working with private contractors face 
challenges in setting clear objectives and defining appropriate 
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performance measures (Kettner & Martin, 1995; Yusuf & Leavitt, 
2014).  
Another important concern for performance measurement is that 
public agencies should define performance broadly enough to cover 
the key dimensions of performance (Wholey, 1999).   Multiple 
categories of performance measures are available to public agencies, 
including inputs, activities, outputs, short-term outcomes, intermediate 
outcomes, end outcomes, and impacts (Hatry, 1999; Milward, Provan, 
& Else, 1993; Padovani & Young, 2008; Poister, 2008). 
Applying the three dimensions of engineering, business, and public 
administration to the study of performance in the transportation field, 
Baird and Stammer (2000) focused on infrastructure condition and 
use; effectiveness, efficiency, and equity; and broader measures 
important to societal stakeholders (e.g. mobility, accessibility, 
convenience, user satisfaction).  Fernandez (2007), in his analysis of 
contracting performance, used a multidimensional measure based on 
eight indicators: actual cost compared to projected cost; actual cost 
compared to in-house service delivery; quality of work; responsiveness 
to government’s requirements; timeliness; service continuity; 
compliance with the law; and customer satisfaction.  For our study of 
transit agencies, we explore the key performance indicators public 
agencies use when monitoring contracts.  We specifically examine the 
extent to which transit agencies are using performance measures in 
four categories: (1) inputs, (2) process, (3) outputs, and (4) outcomes.  
These categories reflect the efficiency and logic models approach. We 
also look at whether agencies have a separate contract monitoring 
unit. Having a specifically dedicated unit ensures that agencies have 
the capacity to monitor contracts (and contractor performance) 
regularly and continuously.  
Monitoring Performance 
Specifying the appropriate metrics is a necessary element of 
performance measurement and management.  However, if the 
measurement information is not used, the effort and cost of the 
performance management process will be wasted.  The key to 
performance management is the periodic measurement of 
performance. Therefore, it is necessary for public agencies to monitor 
contractors’ performance to determine if and how they are meeting 
performance metrics. 
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Multiple tools and approaches are available to public agencies for 
tracking and monitoring contractors’ performance.  Some are directly 
related to service delivery, while others are end customer and process-
oriented.  Brown and Potoski (2003a), for example, suggest that public 
agency evaluation capacity can include conducting citizen surveys, 
monitoring customer complaints, making field observations, and 
analyzing operational records. 
Transportation agencies, on the whole, have become more focused 
on the customer perspective (Stein & Sloane, 2003), relying more on 
customer or citizen surveys. For example, state DOTs regularly conduct 
user surveys to obtain perceptions of and satisfaction with the 
transportation system.  Similarly, transit agencies use customer 
surveys “to solicit feedback on customers’ perceptions of the reliability, 
safety, convenience, and overall quality of the service they provide” 
(Poister, 2007, p. 491).  
We specifically examine the extent to which transit agencies utilize 
four mechanisms to track and monitor contractor performance: (1) 
customer satisfaction surveys; (2) levels of service provision; (3) 
customer complaints; and (4) secret shoppers.  
Holding Contractors Accountable – Rewards and Sanctions 
Monitoring contractors’ performance is a costly activity.  Case 
studies have found that monitoring costs average about 20% of 
contracting costs (Pack, 1989; Prager, 1994).  Teal (1991), in a study 
of contracting in California, found that administrative and monitoring 
costs of contracting represented approximately 14% of the contract 
amount.  Hurwitz (1996), also using a transit contracting case study in 
California, found average administrative and monitoring costs of $0.10 
to $0.25 per vehicle-mile.  Furthermore, as noted by Cooper, rigorous 
contract monitoring can become part of a police-oriented approach to 
contracting where “the contract manager is viewed as the cop on the 
beat preventing bad things from happening” (2003, p. 104). Instead of 
enhancing cost savings or improving service quality, such approaches 
can potentially “absorb energies that need to be directed toward 
service improvement and management innovation” (p. 106). 
Therefore, even with rigorous contract monitoring, contract 
outcomes may not be achieved.  Monitoring can be ineffective if 
contractors can game the system or if there are no consequences of 
the performance being monitored.  “The challenge lies in creating a 
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strong linkage between performance measurement and the use of 
information to improve performance” (Yusuf & Leavitt, 2014, p. 215).  
How the contractor responds to the monitoring system depends upon 
the credibility of the system itself and the willingness of the public 
agency to enforce punishment (Yang, Hsieh, & Li, 2009).    
More specifically, effective monitoring requires that contractors be 
incentivized to perform.  Incentives are the mechanisms that motivate 
contractors and maintain accountability through threat of sanctions. 
The use of incentives can counterbalance contractor opportunism 
(Barthélemy & Quélin, 2006).  Incentives can take two forms: positive 
incentives or rewards for satisfactory performance, and negative 
incentives or sanctions for unsatisfactory performance.  Sanctions, 
while not the only way to ensure contractor accountability in 
contracting, are one of the most powerful mechanisms to “correct or 
penalize performance shortfalls” (Girth, 2014, p. 318).  But, the simple 
threat of sanction may not sufficiently incentivize contractors.  Public 
agencies must enforce sanctions for them to be effective.   
Lawther and Martin (2014) offer an example of how key 
performance indicators can be linked to financial incentives 
(availability payments) in a rewards-based performance management 
system to improve performance, particularly in the context of 
contracting and public-private partnerships.  While public agencies 
may specify and monitor performance, if they do not act on the 
performance information, there will be insufficient incentives for 
private contractors to focus on performance.  “Once demand risk is 
removed from private partners, incentives and sanctions that 
accompany the stated performance standards during operations and 
maintenance are the only means by which optimal performance can be 
ensured” (Lawther & Martin, 2014, p. 230). 
In their discussion of contracting for health services, Bennett and 
Mills (1998) highlight the role of contractor monitoring and 
implementing sanctions for contractor nonperformance as two 
important steps in the successful contracting process.  These 
sanctions may include verbal warnings, reduction of payment or non-
payment to contractors, and even legal proceedings against the 
contractor.  The public agency must specify the sanctions in the 
contract and ensure that sanctions are implemented if the contractor 
fails to perform.  
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We examine what penalties, incentives, and liquidated damages 
are being employed by transit agencies to ensure contractor 
performance.  We also analyze whether having the internal capacity in 
the form of a monitoring unit leads agencies to use a different 
incentives structure than those without such a unit.  
METHODOLOGY 
Our analysis uses data from a biannual survey of transit managers’ 
perceptions of contracting out.  Survey data were collected in 2009, 
2011, and 2013. This time period captures the recovery period 
following the Great Recession. This unique data was collected using an 
Internet-based survey service that provides the privacy for managers 
to respond. The survey ensures respondents’ anonymity.  The survey 
was distributed to all transit agency managers that report to the 
National Transit Database with publicly available email addresses 
(over 600). The response rate in 2009 was 22.6% (137), 30.7% in 
2011 (188), and 36.6% (249).1 
The purpose of the surveys were to build upon  a previous 2001  
study of transit services contracting that was reported in the 
Transportation Research Board (TRB) Special Report No. 258, 
Contracting for Bus and Demand-responsive Transit Services: A Survey 
of U.S. Practice and Experience (Transportation Research Board, 
2001).  At the time the report was issued, this survey was the only 
extensive source of information about contracting out in the transit 
industry.  
A series of questions were included in the survey to identify the 
respondent’s agency characteristics including agency type, services 
provided, vehicles operated for bus services, service area, service 
population, and region. We also collected extensive information on 
transit managers’ perceptions of contracting out, including how they 
monitor contracting performance, the duration of contracts, the 
number of bidders, the perceptions of contracting, as well as more 
specific questions about the agency’s largest contract.  In the latter, 
we follow TRB’s (2001) practice of identifying the largest contract and 
monetary considerations and incentives specified by that contract.  For 
a large number of agencies, the largest contract is also their only 
contract.  The distribution of contracts in our study is highly skewed 
with the majority of agencies reporting under ten contracts, and the 
largest proportion reporting just one contract.   
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The following section highlights our results and findings on the 
monitoring capacity of transit agencies, the monitoring methods used, 
and performance measures tracked by transit agencies.  For some 
variables (e.g., monitoring methods or performance provisions), we ran 
Chi-square tests to identify the differences between agencies with and 
without the monitoring units. The Chi-square tests allow us to test 
whether the presence of monitoring units and the use of certain 
monitoring methods or performance provisions are independent of one 
another. Since the test can be applied to categorical variables and the 
majority of contracting provisions are not mutually exclusive 
categories, we created dichotomous variables for the provisions, 
monitoring methods, and monetary provisions where one marks any 
case where a category of interest (e.g., penalties) has been used and 
zero becomes any case where such category has not been used.  
RESULTS 
We separate our findings by the three research questions on 
monitoring capacity, methods, and performance measures.  In addition 
to the quantitative descriptions below, we have created typical profiles 
for transit agencies of various sizes, with different degrees of 
contracting and contract monitoring capacity. Appendix A summarizes 
these profiles. 
Contract Monitoring Capacity 
First, we look at contract monitoring capacity.  If an agency has a 
specific unit dedicated to monitoring contracts, this ensures that the 
agency may have the necessary components of evaluation system as 
described by Fernandez (2007) and Yang, Hsieh, and Li (2009).  For 
example, a separate monitoring unit may make it easier to implement 
a formal monitoring system and conduct periodic evaluations.  The 
monitoring unit does not guarantee the quality of contract evaluations, 
but at least provides capacity to regularly review contracts and 
contractor performance.  The TRB (2001) survey asked the question: 
“Does your agency have a specific unit to monitor the performance of 
contracted services?”  In 2001, 63% of 144 responding transit 
agencies indicated having a monitoring unit.  The same question was 
asked in our 2013 survey and, in contrast, only 37% of 228 
respondents indicated that their agency has a monitoring unit.  This is 
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a surprising and troubling finding because the extent of contracting out 
has been increasing in the transit industry since 2001.   
In terms of the extent of contracting (as a percentage of services), 
as shown in Figure 1, contracting varies depending on whether an 
agency has a monitoring unit.  In Figure 1, the extent of contracting out 
has been broken down into four categories: under 25%, between 25% 
and 50%, between 51% and 99%, and 100%.  About 74% of agencies 
with a monitoring unit contract out 100% of services (top panel), while 
55% of agencies without monitoring unit contact out for all services 
(bottom panel).2  Zullo (2008) finds partial contracting as not efficient, 
and a part of his findings may be attributed to the absence of an 
internal monitoring unit for regular evaluation. 
 
FIGURE 1 









1. Extent of contracting for agencies with monitoring unit
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Additional analysis shows that transit agencies operating in larger 
areas are more likely to have a monitoring unit than agencies operating 
in smaller areas.  Of transit agencies with service areas of populations 
less than 100,000 residents, 24% (out of 58) did not have a contract 
monitoring unit.  In contrast, in medium-sizes areas of population 
between 100,000 and 500,000, 34% (out of 116) of transit agencies 
had a contract monitoring unit.  In larger service areas, with 
populations greater than 500,000 residents, 61% (out of 23) of the 
transit agencies had a separate unit to monitor contracts.  
In the contracts for complex products or products and services with 
high asset specificity, there is also an inherent level of uncertainty 
about the outcomes. This may create perverse incentives for 
contractors, and have been a subject of extensive study on incomplete 
contracts (see Guriev & Kvasov, 2005; Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 
2002, 2007).  The presence of a monitoring unit does not guarantee 
the quality of contracted services, but does provide the data that may 
bridge this uncertainty creating information about the performance 
levels. The long-term relationships establishing trust in the incomplete 






2. Extent of contracting for agencies without monitoring unit
MANAGING FOR PERFORMANCE: MEASUREMENT AND MONITORING OF CONTRACTS 221 
Contract Monitoring Methods 
Besides having a specific unit to evaluate contract performance, 
our surveys contained questions on specific contract monitoring 
methods.  The question about monitoring methods was adopted from 
the TRB 2001 survey, which asked: How do you monitor contractor’s 
performance? The following options were provided: customer 
satisfaction surveys, monitoring the level of service provision, 
monitoring the level of customer complaints, secret shoppers, and 
other.   
There is fairly wide use by transit agencies of methods relying on 
the customer perspective, which is consistent with the focus of 
transportation agencies as a whole (Stein & Sloane, 2003).  For 
example, in 2009, customer complaints, results of secret shoppers, 
and customer satisfaction surveys are employed by 92%, 40%, and 
56% of the responding transit agencies, respectively.  Also, a more 
objective method based on the level of service provision is the most 
commonly used method to monitor contractor performance (about 
82% in all years).       
The results show that transit agencies rely on a combination of 
objective and subjective methods for contractor performance 
monitoring. Customer satisfaction surveys conducted at regular 
intervals are employed by a large proportion of agencies, but never 
relied on as a stand-alone measure.  The monitoring of customer 
complaints and the monitoring of service provision levels (which can 
be done using key performance indicators) are the most frequently 
employed measures, usually in combination with others.  A smaller 
number of agencies employ the use of secret shoppers. Table 1 
summarizes the results by year.  
The majority of transit agencies employ a combination of methods, 
with the most frequent option being the use of all four monitoring 
methods.  Of those agencies without a monitoring unit, only ten have 
implemented all four measures, while 23 agencies with a monitoring 
unit have implemented all methods. Table 2 shows monitoring 
methods for the agencies with and without monitoring units. The 
agencies with monitoring units are more likely to implement all 
measures than the agencies without monitoring units, and these 
differences are statistically significant as measured by  Chi- squares. 
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TABLE 1 
Methods to Monitor Contractor Performance 
 2009 (N=50) 2011 (N=74) 2013 (N=110) 
 Numbers % Numbers % Numbers % 
Customer satisfaction surveys 28 56 49 66 72 65 
Monitoring level of service 
provision 
41 82 61 82 90 82 
Monitoring complaints 46 92 63 85 99 90 
Secret shoppers 20 40 25 34 38 35 
Other 12 24 15 20 23 21 
Non-mutually exclusive replies 51 86 74 91 99 90 
Skipped 2 n/a 15 n/a 17 n/a 
Note: The percentages by year do not sum up to 100% because a respondent 
can select multiple items. The total number of non-skipped replies was 
50 in 2009, 74 in 2011, and 110 in 2013. The question was asked only 
of agencies that currently contract out. The lowest question-specific non-
response rate was in 2009 (4%), and the highest in 2011 (17%). 
 
TABLE 2 
Methods Used to Monitor Contractor Performance by Existence of 
Monitoring Unit, 2013 




Numbers % Numbers % 
Customer satisfaction surveys* 26 19 46 60 
Monitoring level of service provision* 36 26 60 78 
Monitoring complaints* 43 31 56 73 
Secret shoppers* 12 9 26 34 
Other 11 8 12 16 
All four methods 10 7 23 30 
Non-mutually exclusive responses 40 29 59 77 
Skipped 6 4 8 10 
Note: The percentages by year do not sum up to 100% because a respondent 
can select multiple items. *Indicates that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the monitoring methods for the agencies with and without 
monitoring units at 0.05 level, using Chi-square tests. There is no 
statistical difference in implementation of the ‘other’ category. 
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We believe this illustrates that implementing a variety of 
monitoring methods (or increasing the scope of evaluation) is easier 
with the presence and guidance of a dedicated contract monitoring 
department.  
Since effective monitoring requires that contractors be incentivized 
to perform, we examined individual contract provisions (for the largest 
contract) for fixed route bus services.  Table 3 indicates that penalties 
and liquidated damages are the most popular performance provisions 
in 2013. This is comparable to data reported by the TRB in 2001.  In 
the TRB survey, 43 agencies reported specifying penalties, 45 included 
liquidated damages in contract specification, and 25 included 
incentives.  Penalties and liquidated damages are negative incentives, 
and as such, are utilized to counteract vendor opportunism 
(Barthélemy & Quélin, 2006).  
 
TABLE 3 
Performance Provisions Specified in the Largest Contract 
 2009 (N=40) 2011 (N=53) 2013 (N=81) 
 Numbers % Numbers % Numbers % 
Penalties 20 50 32 60 47 58 
Incentives 11 28 17 32 13 16 
Liquidates damages 20 50 28 53 44 54 
Other 5 13 4 8 7 9 
Non-mutually 
exclusive responses 
18 45 28 53 36 44 
Skipped 12 n/a 36 n/a 46 n/a 
Note: The percentages are shown for the total non-skipped answers. The 
percentages by year do not sum up to 100% because a respondent can 
select multiple items. The question was only available to those agencies 
that currently contract out. The question specific non-response rate 
ranges from 23% in 2009 to about 40% in 2011. 
 
There may be a difference in contract performance provisions 
depending on whether or not the agency has a contract monitoring 
unit.  Over time, a transit agency may acquire additional data on the 
scope and quality of contracted services that may help in identifying 
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appropriate levels of performance and associated penalties.  These 
data may not be available for a recent contract.  Thus, the 
implementation of incentives may be more difficult when there is a lack 
of data. When we specifically explore the 2013 data on incentives, we 
see that agencies with contract monitoring units employ the bulk of 
contractor incentives.  In essence, transit agencies with monitoring 
units are twice as likely to utilize incentives for their contracts.   
Girth (2014) argues that sanctions can be very powerful 
mechanisms for ensuring contractor performance.  But, these 
sanctions must be enforced if they are to be effective.  As shown in 
Table 4, agencies with a monitoring unit use sanctions (penalties and 
liquidated damages) to a greater extent compared to those agencies 
without a monitoring unit.   This is not surprising, as agencies with 
greater monitoring capacity (i.e. have contract monitoring units) are 
also more likely to have the capacity to enforce sanctions.    
 
TABLE 4 







 Numbers % Numbers % 
Penalties* 14 45 33 66 
Incentives* 3 10 10 20 
Liquidated Damages* 13 42 31 62 
Other 5 16 2 4 
Non-mutually exclusive responses* 8 26 28 56 
Skipped 22 n/a 21 n/a 
Note: The percentages are shown from the total non-skipped answers. The 
percentages do not sum up to 100% because a respondent can select 
multiple items. The question was only available to those agencies that 
currently contract out. *Indicates that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the incentive use for the agencies with and without 
monitoring units at 0.05 level, using Chi-square tests.  
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An agency can also specify the incentives structure through 
monetary provisions.  In our study, such data is available for the 
agencies’ largest contract.  These monetary arrangements include 
market-incentives such as a negotiated rate per unit of service, 
vehicles or facilities leases, and reimbursements for operating deficits 
(see Table 5).  Vehicle leases are usually used in combination with 
other monetary arrangements.  This may be an indication that the 
transit agencies must use specially equipped buses to satisfy 
 
TABLE 5 
Monetary Provisions for the Largest Agency Contract 
 
Monetary Provision 
2009 (N=52) 2011 (N=89) 2013 (N=127) 
Numbers % Numbers % Numbers % 
Negotiated rate per unit of 
service delivered  
35 73 51 80 80 81 
Cash reimbursement of 
some of the seller's 
operating deficit  
1 2 1 2 2 2 
Cash reimbursement of all 
of the seller's operating 
deficit  
3 6 5 8 2 2 
Cash reimbursement to 
the seller for reduced fare 
programs  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vehicles given, sold, or 
leased below market value 
to the seller  
5 10 10 16 14 14 
Maintenance facility 
leased to the seller  
2 4 6 9 6 6 
Cash payment to the seller 
for specific mass 
transportation services 
13 27 11 17 12 12 
Other 3 6 7 11 12 12 
Non-mutually exclusive 
responses 
11 23 19 30 23 23 
Skipped 4 N/A 25 N/A 28 N/A 
Note: The percentages are shown from the total non-skipped answers. The 
percentages do not sum up to 100% because a respondent can select 
multiple items. The question was only available to those agencies that 
currently contract out.  
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federal requirements such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1991.  The highly specific assets make it more difficult for contractors 
to enter the market, and such leases may enable contracting.  The 
most frequently used type is the negotiated rate per unit of service 
delivered in combination with some other monetary arrangement. 
Several monetary provisions stipulate some form of 
reimbursement for the contractors’ deficits.  Such provisions may be 
easier to negotiate and implement because they do not require the 
measurement of service delivery as in the case of, for example, the 
negotiated rate per unit of service delivered.  However, they are likely 
to be less effective as mechanisms to ensure contractor performance 
as they transfer to the transit agency some of the risk of 
underperformance.    
The application of monetary provisions differs between agencies 
with and without monitoring units (2013 survey, see Table 6).  Among 
those who responded to both questions, there are slightly more 
agencies that both have a monitoring unit and use a negotiated rate 
per unit of service.  In fact, almost 80% of agencies who use this 
technique have a monitoring unit (45 out of 57).  This is an indication 
that the presence of monitoring units allows agencies to implement 
performance measurement at a different level.  The presence of a 
monitoring unit may facilitate the implementation of penalties or 
incentives, or application of a negotiated rate per service delivered 











Numbers % Numbers % 
Negotiated rate per unit of service 
delivered*  
35 83 45 79 
Cash reimbursement of some of the 
seller's operating deficit  
2 5 0 0 
Cash reimbursement of all of the 
seller's operating deficit  
1 2 1 2% 
MANAGING FOR PERFORMANCE: MEASUREMENT AND MONITORING OF CONTRACTS 227 







Numbers % Numbers % 
Cash reimbursement to the seller for 
reduced fare programs  
0 0 0 0 
Vehicles given, sold, or leased below 
market value to the seller  
8 19 6 11 
Maintenance facility leased to the 
seller  
2 5 4 7 
Cash payment to the seller for specific 
mass transportation services  
6 14 6 11 
Other* 4 10 8 14 
Non-mutually exclusive responses 11 26 14 20 
Skipped  13 N/A 10 N/A 
Note: The percentages are shown from the total non-skipped answers. The 
percentages do not sum up to 100% because a respondent can select 
multiple items. The question was only available to those agencies that 
currently contract out. *Indicates that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the incentive use for the agencies with and without 
monitoring units at 0.05 level, using Chi-square tests. The other monetary 
provisions are either not statistically significant or the Chi-square test 
cannot be applied (cash reimbursement of some of the seller's operating 
deficit, cash reimbursement of all of the seller's operating deficit, cash 
reimbursement to the seller for reduced fare programs, and maintenance 
facility leased to the seller) due to the low expected count.  
 
Performance Measures 
Our 2013 survey includes the open-ended question: “What key 
performance indicators do you use for monitoring your contracts?”  
Table 7 lists the top performance indicators used by transit agencies 
in the 2013 survey.  On-time performance was by far the most popular 
response with over half of all agency managers reporting the use of 
this measure.  The number of customer complaints was second (25%).  
Ridership costs, missed trips, accidents, and maintenance logs and 
costs were cited fewer than 10% of the time by respondents. 
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TABLE 8 
Top Ten Most Frequently Cited Performance Indicators, 2013 
1 On-time performance 
2 Number of complaints 
3 Ridership costs 
4 Missed trips/ Breakdowns/ Road calls 
5 Accidents 
6 Maintenance logs/ Costs 
7 Ridership  
8 Miles between road calls 
9 Budget adherence/ Cost containment 
10 Safety 
 
Only a few agencies used ridership numbers, miles between road calls, 
budget adherence of the contractor and safety.  Other, less frequently 
cited performance measures, included operator courtesy, driver 
citations, and number of passengers left on the side of the road.  One 
transit agency reported that measures were under development, and 
another that it uses measures required by its regional authority.  A few 
agencies did not use any performance measures to monitor contracts 
or were not sure of the measures used. Two respondents simply stated 
“the standard measures” or “the standard twelve measures.”3 
We can also classify the types of performance measure utilized by 
transit agencies in 2013 using Hatry’s (1999) framework of input, 
process, outputs, and outcomes.  As shown in Table 8, most 
performance measures are outputs and outcomes.  The most popular 
measure – on-time performance – is an outcome measure used by 
about half of the agencies.  Fewer agencies used accidents and 
customer satisfaction as performance measures.  Only one input 
measure, operating costs, is used frequently in the transit industry for 
contracts.  
Profiles of Contract Monitoring and Performance Measurement in 
Practice 
The purpose of this study is to better understand the current state 
of practice of contract monitoring and performance measurement as it 
applies to transit agencies.  Our survey results indicate that some 
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TABLE 9 
Performance Measures Utilized by Transit Agencies by Type, 2013 
Input 
Measures 





















Trip Denials  
 
contract monitoring capacity exists but that there is variation across 
the agencies in terms of how contracts are monitored and performance 
is measured. To contextualize our findings and improve understanding 
of the state of current practice, we also developed profiles of ‘typical’ 
agencies.  We did so by analyzing results of the 2013 survey and 
conducting an extensive analysis of transit agencies’ websites.  These 
profiles are organized by size of service area, extent of contracting, and 
presence of monitoring unit.  These profiles illustrate differences in 
contract management capacity and use of methods and metrics across 
different types of transit agencies.  The profiles are briefly discussed 
below and summarized in Appendix A. 
We have separated the transit agencies into three groups: small 
agencies (serving populations under 100,000), medium-size agencies 
(serving populations over 100,000 up to 499,000), and large agencies 
(serving populations over 500,000 and under one million).  Only a 
small number of agencies serve populations over one million, and 
these agencies operate in very unique environments.  In each group, 
we separated cases by the presence of a monitoring unit, and selected 
cases representing typical responses.  For example, a typical small 
agency with a monitoring unit will contract out 80-100% of the services, 
while a typical small agency without a monitoring unit will contract out 
under 25% or almost all (100%) of their services.  The typical medium-
sized agency tends to contract out under 25% of services or 100% of 
services, and the typical large agency tends to contract out 100% of its 
services, regardless of whether a contract monitoring unit is present.  
In terms of monetary arrangements, agencies with monitoring units 
(regardless of size) tend to implement more complex structures 
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compared to those without monitoring units.  Smaller agencies also 
tend to use a wider range of performance measures, while larger 
agencies tend to utilize a broader array of monitoring methods.  
Agency 1: Small Agency, Contracts Out 80%, Has a Monitoring Unit  
This is a city-run agency that contracts out for bus and paratransit, 
primarily to use union labor.  By state law, the agency cannot bargain 
with the union: therefore, the city contracts with a management 
company.  The agency has a specific unit to monitor contract 
performance and contracts out about 80% of its bus service.  It 
contracts for service delivery, maintenance and security.  The agency 
typically has three bidders and bids the contract out every three years. 
The agency monitors contractor performance with customer 
satisfaction surveys, monitoring of level of service provision, 
monitoring of complaints, and secret shoppers. With the agency's 
largest contract for bus services, the same vendor has been used for 
six years.  Penalties for lack of performance and cash reimbursement 
of all of the vendor's operating deficit are included in the contract.   
Agency 2: Small Agency, Contracts 100%, Has No Monitoring Unit 
This agency is a single purpose government that provides multiple 
modes of transportation including bus service, demand response, and 
paratransit.  It contracts out 100% of its bus services at a negotiated 
rate per unit of service delivered and have operated the same contract 
for 13 years.  While the agency does not have a monitoring unit, it uses 
customer satisfaction surveys, monitors the level of service provision, 
monitors complaints, and uses secret shoppers.  Key performance 
indicators used are on-time percentage, passengers per hour, miles 
between road calls, miles between accidents, and missed trips.  It 
monitors the largest contract by imposing a program of penalties and 
incentives if the contractor’s performance fails to meet certain 
minimum targets.  However, the manager notes that the agency has 
never had to impose penalties.  
Agency 3:  Medium Size Agency, Contracts Out 100%, Has a 
Monitoring Unit 
This is a city-run agency that only operates one mode: buses.  It has 
contracted out all (100%) bus services since 1999.  The most recent 
contract has been in place for 14 years.  It has a monitoring unit and 
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uses on-time performance, customer comments, and operating costs 
as performance metrics. The agency uses negotiated rate per unit of 
service delivered and the contract specifies liquidated damages.  
Agency 4: Medium Size Agency, Contracts 2.6 Percent (Partial 
Contractor), Has No Monitoring Unit  
This is a single purpose government agency that currently 
contracts out for bus service (only a small percentage of services, 
2.6%), and provides demand response and ADA paratransit.  It started 
contracting out around 1984, but only contracts out because of peak 
demand times.  The agency does not have a monitoring unit and has 
had just one contract over a five year period.  It currently monitors 
performance by the level of service provision, complaints and secret 
shoppers.  Only one key performance indicator is used: on-time 
performance.  The agency uses negotiated rate per unit of service 
delivered because it allows more flexibility in funding services at 
different levels. With the only contract, the agency uses penalties and 
incentives as performance provisions. 
Agency 5: Large Agency, Contracts Out 20%, Has a Monitoring Unit  
This agency, a city municipal corporation, operates bus service and 
contracts out for 20% of its services, customer call center and retail 
store.  The agency has contracted out since 2004.  The agency has a 
monitoring unit and uses negotiated rate per unit of service delivery for 
monetary considerations.  Performance monitoring includes customer 
satisfaction surveys, tracking level of service provision and client 
complaints, and holding routine performance meetings with the 
vendor.  Key performance metrics are on-time performance and 
customer service complaints.  
Agency 6: Large Agency, Contracts Out 45%, Has No Monitoring Unit  
This single purpose government agency currently provides bus 
service and contracts about 45% of bus service for three years with two 
one-year options available.  The agency does not have a monitoring 
unit but uses on-time performance, number of breakdowns and 
customer satisfaction to monitor contracts.  Its largest contract uses 
the following monetary considerations: negotiated rate per unit of 
service delivered, and vehicles given, sold, or leased below market 
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value to the vendor.  Penalties, incentives, and liquidated damages are 
the performance provisions included in the contract.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Smirnova and Leland (2014) found that reliance on outsourcing by 
transit agencies is driven more by path-dependent behaviors than the 
current fiscal climate.  The implications, then, are “that public 
administrators, and particularly transit agency managers, need to 
choose wisely when deciding whether to contract out for services 
because the decision will seldom be revisited, even during a 
recessionary period” (Smirnova & Leland, 2014, p. 362).  This 
highlights the need to monitor contractors to ensure performance and 
to hold contractors accountable for their performance.   
Contracting out for complex products and services represents 
certain challenges such as measuring performance and setting 
accountability standards.  Yusuf and O’Connell (2014) and Yusuf and 
Leavitt (2014) underscore the importance of contract management 
and oversight to improve accountability.  This study examines the state 
of the practice of contract monitoring and performance measurement 
by transit agencies in the US during 2009, 2011, and 2013.  The 
findings indicate that just over a third of transit agencies reported 
having a special monitoring unit for contracts in the 2013 survey. The 
presence of contract monitoring units also varies with the extent of 
contracting and size of the service area.  A larger percentage of 
agencies with monitoring units, contract out all of their services than 
those without monitoring units.  Monitoring service and customer 
complaints are the most frequently used performance measures in the 
industry. Penalties and liquidated damages are the most frequently 
used negative incentives. Agencies with monitoring units employ twice 
as many incentives as agencies without monitoring units. Finally, we 
find that transit agencies utilize a wide variety of output and outcome 
measures to monitor contractors.  
Our results are fairly consistent with other studies of contract 
management in public agencies in terms of the relatively low use of 
contract monitoring and performance measurement.  Focusing on 
contracting for services by the U.S. Navy, Apte, Apte, and Rendon 
(2011) found that only 25% perceived the level of contract monitoring 
and oversight to be appropriate.  Previous studies have also found a 
wide range of measures used to monitor contractor performance.  In a 
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comprehensive study of contracting by local governments in the U.S., 
the average local government collected five (out of eight) types of 
contractor performance data4 (Fernandez, 2007).  Using a similarly-
constructed sample, Brown and Potoski (2003a) examined local 
government contract evaluation capacity and found that 52% of local 
governments reported using specific techniques (e.g. monitoring 
citizen complaints, conducting citizen survey and field observations, 
etc.) to systematically evaluate contractor’s service delivery.  In a study 
of public bus transit contracting, performance provisions were found to 
be included in some transit contracts (Shetterly, 2002) - positive 
incentives (sharing of cost savings) and negative incentives 
(deductions for non-performance) were used by 13% and 35% of the 
jurisdictions in the sample, respectively.  
This study was intended to provide a survey to better understand 
the current state of practice of contract monitoring and performance 
measurement of transit agencies.  As such, our analysis focused solely 
on the current state of practice of contract monitoring and 
performance measurement.  This examination is an important first 
step in understanding how transit and other public agencies manage 
their contracts effectively to ensure the goals of outsourcing are 
achieved.  From this study, we know that some contract monitoring 
capability, in the form of dedicated contract monitoring unit, does exist 
in transit agencies.  We also know that transit agencies are utilizing 
performance measurement to track contractor performance along 
multiple dimensions such as process, outputs, and outcomes.  
Furthermore, some transit agencies are rewarding and/or sanctioning 
contractors based on their performance.  We have some indication that 
monitoring scope and intensity vary by the extent to which the transit 
agencies contract for services.  In terms of prudent purchasing 
prescribed by Fossett et al. (2000), there appears to be variation not 
only in the capacity to be prudent purchasers, but also in the 
implementation of prudent purchasing practices.   Almost all of the 
transit agencies responding to our survey specify contract monitoring 
and performance measures, but not all agencies have the ability to 
identify if the contract requirements are being met, and reward a highly 
performing vendor or sanction an underperforming one. 
However, our study raises additional questions that are important 
for a broader understanding of effective contract management.  Future 
research should continue this stream of study by examining contract 
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monitoring and performance measurement in more depth both in the 
transit industry and for other government services.  For example, 
contract monitoring and performance measurement are, in theory, 
necessary for ensuring contract fulfillment and that the needs of the 
contracting agency are met.  But, to what extent do they contribute to 
a successful contracting experience?  More specifically, does contract 
monitoring and performance measurement lead to cost savings and 
improved service delivery?  Additionally, why do some transit agencies 
have greater contract monitoring capabilities than others?  What 
factors drive transit agencies to have greater monitoring scope and/or 
intensity?  Furthermore, some questions arise regarding specific 
differences in terms of practices across agencies.  For example, 
penalties and liquidated damages are used to a greater degree by 
transit agencies with monitoring units, compared to those without 
monitoring units.  What factors account for this difference?  These 
sanctions - penalties and liquidated damages – also seem to be used 
more extensively compared to positive incentives. What may account 
for this popularity, and why are some types of incentives more popular 
than others? 
These are some questions that can, and should be, addressed in 
future research.  Research may also be needed to examine 
interactions between the extent of contracting, contract monitoring, 
and contracting performance.  Zullo (2007), for example, found partial 
contracting to be less efficient than complete outsourcing.  Could this 
relationship between extent of contracting and efficiency be mediated 
by contract monitoring capability, where those agencies that contract 
to a lesser degree also rely less on contract monitoring and 
performance measurement?  Furthermore, some questions arise 
regarding specific differences in terms of practices across agencies.  
For example, penalties and liquidated damages are used to a greater 
degree by transit agencies with monitoring units, compared to those 
without monitoring units.  What factors account for this difference?  
These sanctions - penalties and liquidated damages – also seem to be 
used more extensively compared to positive incentives. What may 
account for this popularity, and why are some types of incentives more 
popular than others? 
Our focus on transit agencies was driven by the high reliance on 
contracting within the transit industry.  However, contracting is 
prevalent in other government functions and various other government 
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agencies rely extensively on contractors to provide key public service 
deliveries.  The growth in what can be viewed as multi-sector service 
delivery – involving government agencies, non-profit organizations, 
and private contractors – has placed greater emphasis on the need to 
understand how to better manage the delivery of services that involve 
actors from multiple sectors.  Our study, while limited to government 
use of contracting by private firms, moves our understanding forward 
by providing the ‘lay of the land’ in terms of current practices.  By 
knowing the current state of the practice we can better understand 
where we need to be in the future.    
NOTES 
1. Our analysis focuses on the subset of the survey respondents 
(transit agencies) that contract out.  
2. The agencies with monitoring units contract out 100% of their 
service more often than the agencies without monitoring units. The 
differences are statistically significantly (Chi-square 4.19, p<0.05) 
for agencies contracting out 100% services vs. all other agencies. 
There is not any statistical difference for agencies contracting 
under 25% of their services or contracting out 51-99% of their 
services. The expected counts are smaller than 5 (making Chi-
square an inappropriate test) for the contracting 25-50% of 
services category. 
3. The number and variety of standard measures may differ 
somewhat from state to state. For example, the Florida 
Department of Transportation uses 16 various standard measures 
of effectiveness, 23 for efficiency, and 29 general performance 
indicators. The National Transit Database lists annual revenue 
miles and hours, vehicles available for maximum services, peak-to-
base ratio, operating expense per vehicle revenue mile, operating 
expense per vehicle revenue hour, operating expense per 
passenger mile or unlinked passenger trip, and unlinked 
passenger trips per revenue mile or per revenue hour. 
4. The eight types are: work inputs, work processes, work outputs, 
timeliness, cost, accuracy of invoicing, legal compliance, and 
complaints. 
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APPENDIX A 
Profiles of “Typical” Transit Agencies’ Contract Monitoring and 
Performance Measurement  
 Monitoring unit No monitoring unit 
Small Agency Size (population under 100,000) 
Extent of contracting 80-100% 100% or under 25% 
Monetary 
Arrangements 
negotiated rate per unit 
of service delivered alone 
or cash payment for 
specific services alone 
negotiated rate per unit 
of service delivered with 




surveys, monitoring level 
of service provision, 
monitoring complaints 
monitor the level of 
service provision and 
monitor complaints  
Performance 
measures:  
on time percentage, 
passengers per hour, 
miles between road calls, 
miles between accidents 
and missed trips as key 
performance indicators 
on time percentage, 
passengers per hour, 
miles between road calls, 
miles between accidents 
and missed trips as key 
performance indicators 
Medium Agency Size (population between 100,000 and 499,000) 
Extent of contracting 100% or under 25% 100% or under 25% 
Monetary 
Arrangements 
negotiated rate per unit of 
service delivered or cash 
payment for specific 
services usually with some 
other provision 
negotiated rate per unit 
of service delivered or 
cash payment for specific 
services usually with 




monitoring level of service 
provision, monitoring 
complaints 





customer complaints  
on-time performance, 
customer complaint  
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APPENDIX A (Continued) 
 Monitoring unit No monitoring unit 
Large Agency Size (population between 500,000 to under 1 million) 
Extent of contracting  100% 100% 
Monetary 
Arrangements 
negotiated rate per unit of 
service delivered and 
other provisions 
**varies by agency 
negotiated rate per unit 




surveys, monitoring the 




surveys, monitoring the 
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